Common Ground, Part 3
If we are going to speak about neutrality, it is of the utmost importance that we define this term so that we may dispel any apparent disagreements. If, by neutral, we mean that the apologist abandons his assumption of God and assumes an argument that presupposes no possibility of God, then not only is this unbiblical, but it is also nonsense. If, however, by neutral we are simply saying that the apologist does not overtly start out with the presupposition that Christianity is true, rather he relies on common ground with the unbeliever, namely the laws of logic (which are from the mind of God, and thus presuppose Him), to form an argument that leads naturally to theism, then we are speaking about a method that is both biblical and compelling.
It should be noted that it is agreed upon by many if not all apologetic methods that to assume order, logic, and the validity of argument itself, requires a basic acknowledgement of absolutism. In other words, any argument requires point and counterpoint, right and wrong, and thus, an absolute standard. Absolute standards imply an Absolute Standard Giver, whom we tend to call “God.” This moral argument is very much like the reverse of the transcendental argument which states that “God’s revelation is the only source of meaning and rationality in the world” (Frame, Christian Apologetics, 110). In the first statement we are saying that since there is meaning and rationality in the world, there must be a God. In the second statement we are saying that since there is a God, there can be meaning and rationality in the world. This is a presupposition (whether consciously admitted or not) that any consistent person must hold in order to open his mouth and defend his claim.
Therefore, if an atheist makes the claim “There is no God,” he must assume God in order to hold his view. In fact, if anyone wishes to defend any point of view, he proves that he assumes God in some fashion. This would therefore suggest that traditionalists are far from presenting neutral (in the unbiblical sense noted above) arguments, for they indeed undermine atheism at every turn.
It should be noted that it is agreed upon by many if not all apologetic methods that to assume order, logic, and the validity of argument itself, requires a basic acknowledgement of absolutism. In other words, any argument requires point and counterpoint, right and wrong, and thus, an absolute standard. Absolute standards imply an Absolute Standard Giver, whom we tend to call “God.” This moral argument is very much like the reverse of the transcendental argument which states that “God’s revelation is the only source of meaning and rationality in the world” (Frame, Christian Apologetics, 110). In the first statement we are saying that since there is meaning and rationality in the world, there must be a God. In the second statement we are saying that since there is a God, there can be meaning and rationality in the world. This is a presupposition (whether consciously admitted or not) that any consistent person must hold in order to open his mouth and defend his claim.
Therefore, if an atheist makes the claim “There is no God,” he must assume God in order to hold his view. In fact, if anyone wishes to defend any point of view, he proves that he assumes God in some fashion. This would therefore suggest that traditionalists are far from presenting neutral (in the unbiblical sense noted above) arguments, for they indeed undermine atheism at every turn.
posted by DrewDog at 1:10 PM
10 Comments:
I wish to examine your argument that the moral argument is similar to the transcendental argument. I think that the moral argument is completely different from the transcendental argument because, when stated, the transcendental argument is the converse of the moral argument. Further, I believe that through examining this relationship one will see that the transcendental argument is in fact not an argument at all. Rather, it can be reduced to a mere tautology…(forgive me if I have not clearly explained my argument, and any mistakes in my grammar or reasoning is due to nothing more nor less than my ignorance).
In your paper you write,
…This moral argument is very much like the reverse of the transcendental argument which states that “God’s revelation is the only source of meaning and rationality in the world” (Frame, Christian Apologetics, 110). In the first statement we are saying that since there is meaning and rationality in the world, there must be a God. In the second statement we are saying that since there is a God, there can be meaning and rationality in the world. This is a presupposition (whether consciously admitted or not) that any consistent person must hold in order to open his mouth and defend his claim.
Let’s begin with the moral argument. You argue that the moral argument says, “since there is meaning and rationality in the world, there must be a God.” Now, for the sake of the argument, let’s simply state this conditionally. Thus we would say, “If there is meaning and rationality in the world then there is God.” We can symbolize this as P→Q. Let’s let this statement be represented by the letter M since it is the moral argument.
Next we will examine the transcendental argument. You argue that the transcendental argument says, “since there is a God, there can be meaning and rationality in the world.” For the sake of the argument, let’s simply state this conditionally as well. Thus, we would say, “If there is a God then there is meaning and rationality in the world.” We can symbolize this as P→Q. Let’s let this statement be represented by the letter T since it is the transcendental argument.
Now, let’s examine statement M. What would be the converse (the opposite) of statement M? It would be if Q→P. Or, “if there is a God then there is meaning and rationality in the world.” When one does this, one sees, and sees clearly, that the converse of M is T. Thus, by definition, M and T cannot be similar.
Let’s look at a counterexample to see this a little more clearly. Let’s let statement M in this case be, “If it is a dog then it is an animal.” We can symbolize this as P→Q. What would be the converse of this statement? It would be If Q→P. That is, “If it is an animal then it is a dog.” Let’s let this statement be T. Now, when one looks at this clearly, one sees that the converse of M is T. Thus, M cannot be similar to T since M is the opposite of T. That is to say, “if it is a dog then it is an animal” is not at all similar to “if it is an animal then it is a dog.” We can state this categorically. “All dogs are animals” is not at all similar to “all animals are dogs.” Further, if we examine the argument carefully, we will see that in our dog case T is simply not true. It is not the case that all animals are dogs. So the converse of statement M, in this case, is false.
What about the moral argument and the transcendental argument? Let’s look at the arguments carefully. The moral argument, when stated properly, might look like this:
If there is a moral law then there must be a moral law giver
There is a moral law
Therefore, there is a moral law giver.
Now, for the sake of time, I will not examine the veracity of our premises. I will simply take the easy road and refer to others more qualified; men who have already shown that the premises are true and that the argument is valid, and thus allowing us to conclude that this is a sound argument. Now in this case it is important to note that we are not necessarily arguing for the God of the Bible. We are simply arguing for an “Absolute Standard Giver” as you argue well in your paper. We are simply arguing from the general principle of a moral law to the source of that law. Now we can draw inferences who we think this law giver must be, but this would be an ontological argument not a moral argument.
What about the transcendental argument? The transcendental argument, when stated conditionally, might look like this:
If there is a God then there is a meaning and rationality
There is a God
Therefore, there is meaning and rationality
Let’s begin by noting that we can keep the same structure as the moral argument if we wanted too, however, this might be a distortion of the transcendental argument since the transcendental argument takes a stronger position. It actually begins with the God of the Bible. I don’t think it’s arguing for anything less. However, you are the expert in this regard and so I will leave that to you to decide. I still think that even if you keep the same structure as above you will get the same results.
Now, at first glance one will see that the argument is desperately begging the question. How can we be sure that there is meaning and rationality in the world? The argument says because there is a God. But how do we know that this God is or wills meaning and rationality in his creation? Suppose that this God is, for lack of a better example, Descartes’ evil demon. That is to say, perhaps this God is deceiving us into believing that there is meaning and rationality. How are we justified in believing this? Of course, from the argument alone we are not. We simply have to assume that this kind of God exists. However, if we assume that this God exists then of course there is meaning and rationality. We have simply defined it to be this way. In which case this is no argument at all. It is merely a tautology.
I think that more can be said in this regard, and perhaps if I was writing a treatise I might develop this point. However, in order to stave off any boredom, let me conclude by saying 1) the moral and transcendental argument are not similar because, when stated conditionally, we see that statement T is the converse of statement M. Thus, by definition, the two cannot be similar. Just as saying “if it is a dog then it is an animal” is not similar to saying “if it is an animal then it is a dog.” 2) the transcendental argument is not an argument at all; rather, it boils down to be a mere tautology. We must define God as a being who is and/or wills meaning and rationality. Once we’ve done this, however, it is merely true by definition that there is meaning and rationality. Of course, for the atheist this is not good enough!
Great point Aaron. I agree with your analysis. Perhaps I stated it poorly in my blog (maybe even erroneously), but my point was that the classical apologists and the presuppositional apologists are both agreeing (in their arguments) that God is the source of meaning and rationality. Would you agree with this?
I am not sure what you want me to agree with.
If you want me to agree that “the classical apologists and the presuppositional apologists are both agreeing (in their arguments) that God is the source of meaning and rationality” then I would say no because I think that there arguments are completely different.
Perhaps this may help clarify: I think that both the proponent of the transcendental argument and the proponent of the moral argument are drawing the same inference. But, as I hopefully showed, the one who uses the transcendental argument is not drawing that inference from sound reasoning.
If you want me to agree that “God is the source of meaning and rationality and rationality” then I would say yes.
Sorry. Again, I spoke in a way that could be misunderstood. My point was that both apologists come to the same conclusion (that God is the source of meaning and rationality), but as you point out, in different ways. One which is an argument, and the other which is merely a tautology.
Here is something I found which Wilson said in a debate with an atheist:
The fact that rational thought exists does not entail the conclusion that God exists. It presupposes God's existence. The argument is not "rational thought, and therefore God." The argument is "God, and therefore rational thought." God is never the conclusion; He is the only necessary premise of any argument. This is why many people accuse those who present the transcendental argument of committing the fallacy of petitio principii, that of begging the question. How can one debate the existence of God by assuming or presupposing that God exists? Are you not assuming you are supposed to prove? Exactly so.
But this is not a problem because all ultimate questions involve circularity, and we might as well get used to it. The virtue of the Christian transcendental argument is that this feature which is necessary to all creaturely thought is simply embraced and understood, and the right ultimate question is properly identified. But the process of necessary circularity can be still seen when anything is falsely elevated to the level of ultimacy. To the fellow who says, "You can't tell me that God exists just because He does. By contrast, I base all my thoughts on reason." I would reply, "Oh? What is your reason for doing so?" He may not like transcendental circularity, but he is stuck with it too. How can an embrace of reason be justified through an appeal to reason? That is no different (at least as far as circularity is concerned) than the fellow who says that God must exist because otherwise He could not have written John 3:16.
This article still begs the question. The transcendental argument (“God, therefore rational thought”) is not an argument. Because we begin, as Wilson says, with God (and by God he must mean a being who is/wills meaning and rationality) we don’t need to conclude that there is meaning and rationality. As I showed in my first response to you this inference (T) cannot be drawn. Perhaps God is an evil demon who is deceiving us. We must begin with the presupposition that God exists and entailed in this statement is that this God is a rational being (among other attributes). Thus, it is merely true by definition that there is meaning and rationality. I don’t think that we need to go beyond the statement “God exists” even though it appears that Wilson wants to do so.
Further, the problem I have with this is do we shrug the atheist off with a harsh slogan “oh well, you ‘might as well get used to it’?” I think Wilson is being unbiblical and sinful at this point…thoughts?
I don't think he is being unbiblical. I think his point is that we all better get used to it. It's the discussion that you and I have had many times- None of us can escape circularity. We all commit the fallacy of petitio principii.
Well, here goes nothing...
1) What is a neutral argument?
You provided two definitions.
a. "[an arguement where] the apologist abandons his assumption of God and assumes an argument that presupposes no possibility of God..."
Is this actually what presupps believe? or is this a straw man? Presuppsing no possibility of God is a very strong belief, but simply presupposing that God may or may not exist seems fair.
In the context of building an argument, how could a presupp demonstrate to an athiest that God exists, if all their arguments assume that God exists?? Or do presupps avoid talking to atheists?
b. "[one where] the apologist does not overtly start out with the presupposition that Christianity is true,..."
Do presupps disagree with this? I don't see how they could. How can anyone argue for Christianity by presupposing that Christianity is true? Seems silly.
2) What exactly are presupps presupposing? Theism? That Christianity is true?
This is a bit confusing. Theism and Christianity are not equivalent.
I hope you can clear up my understanding...I'm sure I'm missing something simple here.
Vijay
Thanks Vijay. So many questions, I can’t make a dent right now, but I’ll try as best I can:
1)
a. As I study this definition, I believe that this is indeed a straw man. I was not meaning to set up a straw man, but my poor choice of words may have led me to do this.
Secondly, I don’t think we can neatly lump all presupps together. In fact, I am a presuppositional apologist, but I’m also a traditional apologist, which was the point of my writing this paper, but that is another issue.
I think part of the whole problem between presuppositional and classical apologists is that there is a failure to define terms and stick to those definitions (indeed, this was my point in giving 2 definitions). Presuppositionalists claim that a neutral argument is one in which God is not assumed, and as I have tried to point out, this is simply impossible to do, since God is the source of meaning and rationality. You can indeed make the claim (as all atheists do) that you do not assume that there is a God, but this is simply a suppression of the truth, and indeed, nonsense.
Presuppositionalists claim that there is no such think as a neutral argument, in that everyone comes to the table with biases and they believe that to assume neutrality is to assume that God might not exist. My position agrees that there is no such thing as a neutral argument, because indeed, if you enter into debate, you are already playing by God’s rules, and thus assuming Him (as opposed to assuming that He might not exist). So where the presuppositional apologist would argue that “neutrality” is disguised atheism, I would argue that it is disguised theism.
For an example of how a presuppostitionalist might debate with an atheist, go here.
b. I would say that generally, yes, presuppositional apologists disagree with this. They say that if a Christian abandons his presupposition that Christianity is true, he is reasoning rebelliously. Hopefully my paper clears up why this is false.
I’ll try to answer part two another time. I hope I haven’t muddied the waters, but we should probably get this first set of questions cleared up before we move on.
Sorry. I forgot to put the link in for the presuppositional debate with an athiest:
http://www.bellevuechristian.org/faculty/dribera/htdocs/PDFs/Apol_Bahnsen_Stein_Debate_Transcript.pdf
Also, after reading this, you can see where my first definition of neutrality came from. I still am open to the idea though that the way I put it might appear to be an oversimplification at best, and a straw man at worst.
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